As with global warming, so with financial crises -externalities have a lot to answer for. We look at three of them. First the financial accelerator due to 'fire sales' of collateral assets --a form of pecuniary externality that leads to liquidity being undervalued. Second the 'riskshifting' behaviour of highly-levered financial institutions who keep the upside of risky investment while passing the downside to others thanks to limited liability. Finally, the network externality where the structure of the financial industry helps propagate shocks around the system unless this is checked by some form of circuit breaker, or 'ring-fence'.
Introduction
The Pareto-efficiency of competitive economic equilibrium is, of course, a central feature of the Arrow-Debreu paradigm. But in 1986 two papers appeared concerning the welfare inefficiency of competitive equilibria. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis showed that 'missing markets' implied the possibility of Pareto-improving interventions; while Greenwald and Stiglitz demonstrated that missing markets and asymmetric information implied that competitive market prices could generate 'pecuniary externalities' --with market prices generating side-effects conceptually similar to technological externalities (such as the productive interactions of Silicon Valley or the negative effects of industrial pollution).
Historical events were soon to lead to a much greater reliance on market forces world-wide, however. The break-up of the USSR signalled the collapse of the Communist challenge to market-oriented models of economic development and encouraged a shift from managed capitalism to market capitalism -with the administrations of Mrs Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan in the vanguard. In the UK, for instance, there was widespread privatisation of nationalised industries and the stock of housing; and, in financial services, the Big Bang of 1986 signalled the opening up of the City of London to the forces of global competition.
Likewise in the USA --where Government intervention was increasingly seen as 'part of the problem not the solution' --there was pressure to deregulate financial services; and the success of Mr Greenspan in handling the US stock market break on Black Monday in 1987 encouraged the belief that self-regulation plus adept interest rate management could head off financial crisis.
New York and London being world-leading financial centres competing for global business, this triggered a regulatory 'race to the bottom' --with reliance on self-regulation on one side of the Atlantic matched by 'light touch' regulation on the other 2 . Over time this led on to repeal of the Glass Steagall legislation in the USA; and to such a rapid expansion of UK banking that at the peak it was host to an industry with a balance sheet more than five times local GDP! What then of the early warnings from 1986? They seemed to be largely forgotten. Even when severe financial crisis erupted in East Asia in 1997/8, this was widely seen as a symptom of nascent capitalism --of poorly regulated banks, connected lending and excessive foreign currency exposure --to be solved by upgrading financial regulation to the exemplary standards of the leading economies in the West. The IMF did put to one side its plans for increased deregulation of the capital account 3 ; but faith in the efficacy of lightly-regulated markets in advanced economies was largely unshaken. Indeed the assumption of financial market efficiency was to become the hall-mark of macroeconomic models used by central banks to steer the economy in the time of Great Moderation. Even when markets departed from fundamentals, as in the US 'high-tech' bubble which characterised the early years of the 21 st century, interest rate policy on its own seemed adequate for handling the consequences of the asset price correction, Greenspan (2002) .
But the financial crisis in North Atlantic economies in 2007/8 --and the threat it posed of collapse for the Western financial system and a possible repeat of the Great Depression -has forced a reconsideration of consensus, with Mr Greenspan himself acknowledging that his faith in the efficiency of market forces had been misplaced. Do financial crises provide concrete examples of financial externalities in action? A recent empirical study by Majnoni and Powell (2011) using quarterly data for 139 corporate issues from the period 1999-2006 suggests that --at least for emerging markets -they have. They test the hypothesis that corporate spreads will normally be determined by firm, country and international financial characteristics; but in addition they will rise at times of crisis due to endogenous risk or amplification effects. Their empirical results show an amplification of shocks during crisis times depending on the size of the credit market before the crisis. For banking crises in particular, the weakness of the banking system amplifies shocks by increasing the cost of capital for non-financial firms.
4
What are the nature of these externalities? How to reshape the rules and structure of banking world-wide to limit them? How likely are these reforms to be effected? These are the issues to be explored in this paper. In the first section we look at fire-sale externalities and the under-provision of liquidity; in the second section we look at the risk-shifting due to limited liability; finally in section three at the risk of contagion posed by the network feature of banking.
In conclusion, we note how vividly the shock to the Western economies -now mired in recession with the prospect of years of slow growth to come -contrasts with the success of managed capitalism of India and China both in avoiding these crises and in maintaining enviable rates of economic growth. The capacity of an economic system to limit pecuniary externalities may, it seems, be an important determinant of capitalist development.
Fire-sales and the under-provision of liquidity
The 'financial accelerator' as pecuniary externality
Even without financial intermediaries, a credit-constrained market economy -where collateral is used to handle repudiation risk -can exhibit liquidity crises and collapsing asset prices. In the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , for example, productive small business entrepreneurs wish to raise outside finance to acquire the fixed capital assets but face an agency problem because the 'human capital' used in the business is inalienable. Recourse is had to the issuance of debt backed by physical collateral, priced to reflect its productivity outside the entrepreneurial sector (i.e. in the hands of the 'deep pocket' lenders). In the face of uncorrelated, idiosyncratic productivity shocks, agents adversely affected can sell capital and pay down debt without affecting asset prices. But in the face of an adverse macroeconomic shock to entrepreneurial productivity, the borrowing constraint can lead to 'fire-sales' which affect the price of the collateral and trigger yet further sales, i.e. there is a pecuniary externality. This is in sharp contrast to the 'first best' economy where all agents are unconstrained in the credit market, and prices and production are unaffected by net worth. How this externality can impact on the allocation of fixed asset in the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) can be seen schematically in Figure 1 . Fig. 1 . The financial accelerator as pecuniary externality (Source: Miller and Stiglitz, 2010) From equilibrium at E, where debt-financed Small Businesses entrepreneurs hold a stock k* of fixed assets at price q*, the immediate impact of an adverse productivity shock is indicated by the 'initial condition' labelled DD --a schedule for their disposal of fixed assets, k, as needed to match the fall in net worth due to a one-period drop in productivity. This schedule can be interpreted as an unexpected need for liquidity on their part, Krishnamurthy (2009) .
From this perspective, asset prices have to fall until, at point X, the balance-sheet-driven 'demand for liquidity' by Small Businesses (measured to the left from k* to DD) is matched by the 'supply of liquidity' by the residual buyers who have no balance sheet problems (the agents with 'deep pockets') whose take-up of assets is measured from k* to the schedule labelled SS.
As the figure shows, the impact on asset holding has two components. The distance EA indicates how far Small Businesses need to contract their holdings at a constant price, q*, as they dispose of assets to reduce their borrowing in line with the fall in net worth 5 ; the second component, AX, indicates the need for further disposals due to the adverse net worth effects of asset prices falling in the face of concerted selling by small businesses to residual buyers with declining marginal productivity --net worth effects that are exacerbated by expected persistence. In the absence of fresh shocks, the system will gradually return to equilibrium along the stable path 6 SS. Thus the pecuniary externality acts as a 'financial accelerator' that takes short-run equilibrium from A to point X on SS.
Like Gai et al. (2008) , Korinek (2011) modifies this framework so that the borrowing is done by financial intermediaries, risk-neutral bankers who raise finance from households and invest in risky projects; and he shows how the externality involved can be thought of in terms their undervaluation of liquidity. Banks who think that in adverse conditions they can sell assets fail to realise that with correlated shocks these sales will help push prices down. A social planner would anticipate the fall and take on less risk, as he explains:
A planner internalizes the fact that a decline in asset prices leads to financial amplification since it reduces the amount of liquidity that bankers can raise from their sales of each unit of the assets. This pecuniary externality reduces the efficiency of the distribution of capital. By contrast, decentralized bankers take asset prices as given since they realize that the behaviour of an atomistic agent has only an infinitesimal effect on asset prices.
Central bankers and regulators have not generally been acting like social planners it seems.
According to Majnoni and Powell (2011) 'policy makers in the developed world (albeit with notable exceptions) allowed financial institutions to push leverage up to unprecedented limits under a shared optimism regarding the capacity of capital markets to supply an almost infinite amount of liquidity'.
The difference between the private valuation and the planner's social valuation of liquidity, as shown in Fig. 2 , is defined as the pecuniary externality (which falls to zero in unconstrained states). For social efficiency, Korinek (2011) proposes a state-contingent, proportional tax on risk-taking that brings the private cost in line with the social cost. This is a metaphor for macro-prudential regulation as "it closely captures what BIS defines as the macro-prudential approach to regulation: it is designed to limit system-wide financial distress that stems from the correlated exposure of financial institutions and to avoid the resulting real losses in the economy" (p.26). He also proposes taxation on complex securities such as a CDS swap "which is likely to require large payouts precisely in times of financial turmoil" (p.
27). While these policy measures are expressed in terms of taxes on externalities, Korinek argues that they are broadly equivalent to capital adequacy requirements "which have tax-like effects because bank capital is costly" (p28). Such capital requirements could be reduced if CDS swaps can be arranged 'that shift systemic risk to agents outside the financial system who are not subject to financial constraint'. (A deal between US banks and Chinese sovereign wealth fund to deliver liquidity in the crisis, for example?)
This welfare perspective seems to match that of Stiglitz (2010) when he argues that:
'The financial sector has imposed huge externalities on the rest of society. America's financial industry polluted the world with toxic mortgages, and, in line with the well established "polluter pays" principle, taxes should be imposed on it. Besides, welldesigned taxes on the financial sector might help alleviate problems caused by excessive leverage and banks that are too big to fail. Taxes on speculative activity might encourage banks to focus greater attention on performing their key societal role of providing credit.'
Risk of insolvency especially after collapse of asset bubble
In the discussing the amplification shocks through balance sheets and asset prices, it is customary to assume that the 'overshooting' will not be severe enough to render the illiquid agents insolvent, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , Krishnamurthy (2010) and Korinek (2011) . This is a rashly optimistic assumption in the aftermath of an asset bubble --especially if highly levered institutions are involved --as is suggested in Figure 1 where the disposal schedule D'D' associated with an asset bubble fails to intersect SS to the right of SC, the Solvency Constraint.
In Japan, for example, Koo (2008, pp. 14-15) reports that de-leveraging made many firms technically insolvent after the bubble burst. In the recent North Atlantic crisis, Lehman
Brothers famously went bankrupt and Fanny May and Freddie Mac were nationalised soon afterwards --as were two mortgage banks in the UK. In both countries rescue plans for the financial sector also included substantial injections of equity capital for financial institutions 7 .
How the existence of limited liability may induce firms to run the risk of insolvency --and how this can lead to an asset bubble -is the subject of the next section.
Risk-shifting and under-provision of capital
In Casino Capitalism, Hans Werner Sinn notes how the limited liability corporation was and is crucial for the mobilisation of savings to fund risky investment, as the limitation of liability is needed to convince the small shareholder to participate. While this corporate form may be 'capitalism's secret of success', it can be misused by taking on massive leverage, which generates negative externalities in the form of excessive risk-taking whose downside is borne by the creditors. The case of US investment banks is cited as a case in point:
Investment banks, until well into the 1970s, were all organized as partnerships, and as such offered their market partners the unlimited private liability of their owners. 
Limited liability and excessive leverage
To formalise the argument we adapt Allen and Gale (2000) model study asset pricing in the Home country (which, in the light of Sinn's comments, could be thought of as the US).
Assume there are two periods and there are two assets are available in the Home country: a safe asset with variable supply and a risky one in fixed supply of 1. The gross return on the safe asset in period 2 is R ( 1 R ) and that on the risky asset is H R with probability and L R with probability 1 .
8 Prices that would be established without leverage.
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The investment in the risky asset has to be done through financial intermediation (e.g., risk neutral banks) which is perfectly competitive. In the absence of adverse incentives in the intermediation sector, the equilibrium price of the risky asset in period 1 must satisfy:
where F P represents the fundamental price of the risky asset, i.e.,
For each unit investment in the risky asset, an intermediary is required to finance a fraction k by issuing equity and borrows the rest from the market at a cost of
indicates the leverage of the intermediary.) Let k be set by a regulatory authority, where a low value of k indicates weak regulation of financial intermediaries. Assume specifically that
i.e. k is set too low to prevent risk-shifting behaviour on the part of the financial intermediaries.
If all intermediaries are protected by limited liability, then perfect competition implies
where P indicates equilibrium price for the risky asset with financial intermediation. For simplicity, we assume that the cost of the intermediary's own capital is R . So, the first term on the right hand side of (4) represents the payoff to the intermediary in the good state, and the second the payoff in the bad state. Note that, given (3), the realisation of the bad state implies that the debt will not be paid in full since
In this case, the liability will be taken over by an insuring agency, and the intermediary will be closed down and lose its own capital, k .
Solving for P in (4) yields
and together with (3) this implies, F P P i.e., weak regulation leads to asset price bubbles.
represent the relative size of the bubble, then from (2) and (5), one finds
i.e., a higher interest rate R reduces the demand for the risky asset, dampening its price rise; while weaker regulation (lower k ) increases intermediaries' incentive to shift risk and so pushes up the price of the risky asset.
As long as households are not aware of the risk-shifting incentives that exist in the financial intermediaries, they will treat the bubble as if it is an increase in their real wealth, as in Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010) . In the next section, we look at the global impact of this agency problem.
Missing insurance markets and precautionary saving
Let the global exchange economy consist of two countries --Home and Foreign --and last two periods. Only non-state-contingent assets can be traded between Home and Foreign.
Each country is populated by a continuum of ex-ante identical consumers with preferences over consumption in periods 1 and 2, 1 C and 2 C respectively (with * indicates variables for the Foreign country), given by standard additively separable utility function which has a Constant Relative Risk Averse.
Assume there is no uncertainty in the first period and both countries are endowed with 1 unit of the single tradable commodity. . To reflect a higher incidence of macroeconomic shocks in the Foreign country, let two possible states of nature exist in the Foreign country, in period 2, with probability of 1 and respectively, where is the probability of a low state. Given the real global gross interest rate of R , the optimal allocation of consumption in the Foreign country implies its period 1 consumption ) , ( * 1 R C has the properties that:
. The first property is because a rise in R , through both income and substitution effects, decreases period 1 consumption. The second is because higher risk concentration leads to higher precautionary saving in the Foreign country, reducing its period 1 consumption, as discussed in Miller et al (2010) .
Let the period 1 endowment of a consumer in the Home country's be 1, so period 2 resources will consist in an endowment of g 1 and the returns on the investment he/she made through the financial intermediary in period 1. If consumers in the Home country are not aware of incentive problem in financial intermediaries, they would treat an increase in P as an increase in their wealth. So the ex ante wealth for the Home consumers is
positive wealth effect of the bubble. 9 The lower is the value of , the higher is the degree of risk concentration.
For a given the real global gross interest rate R , the optimal allocation of consumption in the To complete the model, we introduce the market-clearing condition for period 1 to determine the equilibrium global interest rate R :
Using the properties of With appropriate choice of and , substantial global imbalances will emerge with little changes of real interest rates.
By assumption, both externalities and missing markets play a role in defining this equilibrium --a situation of excessive, bubble-driven consumption in one country and high precautionary savings in the other. Welfare-improving policy interventions would involve tightening regulation in the Home country (increasing k) and providing a social safety net in the Foreign country (increasing ). With and k above the critical value shown in (3) above,
equilibrium would be at A. (Welfare improvement from A would require completing the global asset market, e.g. by the issuance of GDP bonds.)
Network externalities, contagion and circuit breakers
Liquidity and solvency problems have been studied in previous sections without considering the pattern of interconnectedness between agents --. by assuming, so to say, a representative bank. This could be defended from a reductionist perspective -why look at structure unless you have to? It has been found however, that industry structure is key for contagion: research at the Bank of England and the FRBNY using stochastic network theory shows that different structures can lead to very different propagation mechanisms. This is what we study in this section, beginning with a discussion of the special nature of banks -how it arises from asymmetric information and missing markets; and how it leads to institutional arrangements that call for a structural analysis. This is followed by a simplified model of the banking industry where risk-pooling encourages individual banks to consolidate into banking groups, but the risk of contagion inside any group sets a limit to efficient group size. If the activities that generate contagion can be hived off outside the banking industry, however, group size can expand indefinitely. This could be interpreted as an argument for Glass-Steagall type of separation of commercial and investment banking. It may also provide a rationale for the partial separation recommended by the UK Vickers Commission where investment and commercial banking activities can remain within the same corporate entity but are separated by a "ring-fence".
Liquidity Provision
Taking the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model as a benchmark, the problem facing agents wishing to invest long term subject to random liquidity needs is imperfect markets for liquidity insurance. The tension between long term investment and need for cash can be reduced by trading in the non-contingent spot markets -what Allen and Gale call the market solution. But, as they show, banks can achieve Pareto improvement by pooling of liquidity risks using the law of large numbers. This banking solution is however, subject to a coordination problem in that fears of depositor flight can lead to a bank run. Even without bank runs, there is an obvious risk that the law of large numbers ---while it applies across banks ---does not apply to any individual bank or those in a region. Hence the emergence of interbank markets to pool liquidity. So banks that pool liquidity risk among their customers and interbank markets which economize on system wide liquidity are both prone to collapse. Network gains are subject to coordination failure.
Contagious insolvency
Similar issues arise with respect to insolvency. In their stochastic network model of UK banks and find that an interconnected financial system of a large number of banks can fail if and when a shock hits affects a 'super-spreader' and is then dissipated widely around the system. Modelling how network structure can amplify shocks may be relevant for the analysis of the financial crisis, but in the view of Jon Danielsson (2010) a realistic 'endogenous risk model is beyond our abilities'. In these circumstances, he argues that supervisors should focus their attention on where the risk is created rather than trying to measure it; and that the most important factor is resolution -i.e. the closure of systematically important financial institutions which have gambled and face failure.
Another approach, as in Stiglitz (2011), is to simplify the structure sufficiently so as to achieve analytical tractability. Using the electricity grid system as a metaphor, Stiglitz's analysis involves production uncertainty where the risk of productivity shocks is insured by sharing costs between all the players. The result is a stylised model of endogenous risk, where the gains of connectivity have to be balanced against the risk of propagating large shocks around the system. By analogy with the electricity grid, the principal policy recommendation is the implementation of 'circuit breakers', designed to limit the propagation of large shocks.
To throw light on structural measures currently being taken to reduce the vulnerability of banking -both in terms of resolution procedures and of the 'ring-fencing' -a simplified version of the Stiglitz model is provided in the Annex, with a trade-off between sharing small risks and avoiding large ones. Forming an interconnected group allows for risk-pooling, but it exposes group members to contagion from a large shock hitting any group member, so there is a limit to optimal group size. Given a 'circuit breaker' which prevents any contagion from a large shock, however, there is no limit to the size of the group.
In an open economy context, Stiglitz (2011) suggests that such circuit breakers could be interpreted as restrictions on capital flows. Here we suggest that a circuit breaker be interpreted as a metaphor for structural changes designed to limit the damage an insolvent Systemically Important Financial Institution (SIFI) can impose on the wider banking system. This could include both resolution procedures, and 'ring-fencing' proposals. In the UK, for example, the Banking Act 2009 created a Special Resolution Regime (SRR) 10 , giving the authorities a framework for dealing promptly with distressed banks and building societies; and the Vickers Commission has recommended a 'ring-fence' for the retail banking operations of big universal banks so that it will be possible to let the riskier investment banking arms to fail without imperilling household savings and small business lending.
Financial regulation: the state of play
What is being done to check the impact of externalities in the financial sector since the crisis of 2008/10? The steps being taken involve first the regulation of individual bank portfolios in the form of rules governing capital adequacy and liquidity holdings; second changes to the structure of the industry; and finally macro-prudential interventions across the industry which varies with the business cycle.
A compact summary of the current state of play on the first two of these is provided by Barrell and Davis (2011): On Capital:
The new regulations, which are basically complete, will raise common equity from the previous minimum of 1 per cent of risk-weighted assets to at least 4.5 per cent, and Tier 1 as a whole to 6 per cent. A conservation buffer of 2.5 per cent of risk-weighted assets must also be built up with common equity, and if this is exhausted in a crisis then the bank will be wound up. A minimum ratio of capital to total (unadjusted) assets of 3 per cent must be held.
There is provision for a countercyclical capital buffer of up to 2.5 per cent of riskweighted assets, which is to be imposed at the discretion of the regulators. The regulation of subsidiaries and capital market activities has been substantially tightened, including the introduction of stress-related benchmarks for trading book capital and counterparty credit risk. 
On Liquidity
Two new regulations for liquidity risk are being introduced: first, a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) enforcing sufficient liquid assets to offset net cash outflows during a 30-day period of stress; second, a net stable funding ratio (NSFR) which seeks to ensure a degree of maturity matching over a one-year horizon, including allowance for offbalance sheet commitments.
The Timetable
Given the virulence of the crisis, plans for implementation of these reforms are 
Implications for bank leverage
Academic economists see the need for much tougher regulation than do the guardians of financial stability housed in Basel, as may be seen from the following table where the recommendation of Admati et al (2010) in their evidence to the ICB -that capital be 15% on total assets implying leverage in single figures -is shown in the last line.
By contrast, the minimum capital requirement shown at the top of the table is the 7% baseline ratio of equity to risk weighted assets (RWA) of Basel III. As indicated in column 3, with risk weighted assets at half the balance sheet, the leverage for banks at the Basel III minimum could rise alarmingly close to 30. bonds that convert to equity depending on market conditions.
In addition, ring fenced banks are explicitly banned from providing a wide range of activities. Broadly speaking, these prohibitions would mean that wholesale/investment banking divisions of existing banks could not be placed within the ring-fence 11 ; consequently, in quantitative terms, ring fenced banks would only be allowed to hold 'between a sixth and a third of the total assets currently held by the UK banking sector' ( ICB, para. 3.40).
As the authors of the Report observe, in something of an understatement :
A ring-fence of this kind would also have the benefit that ring-fenced banks would be more straightforward than some existing banking structures and thus easier to manage, monitor and regulate. (ICB, para. 3.40).
Conclusion
Given the pernicious externalities considered above --and the accumulating evidence that they matter greatly in practice --the plans under Basel III look seriously inadequate --especially when compared with the decisive steps taken by the Roosevelt Administration in the 1930s.
In To look at the incentive to form connections, we compare the expected utility for two types of typical nodes: isolated and in a component.
An isolated node
The expected utility at the node is given by:
( 1) where u(.) is a standard increasing and strictly concave utility function, and E is an expectation operator. Here, we assume that .
II. A node in a component
In a partially connected network, consider an completely connected component of size n. The expected utility of a node in the component is: 
In the completely connected component of size n, the idiosyncratic shocks are evenly shared.
(It is clear that if n=1 the above becomes (1), the unconnected case.)
Differentiating the above expected utility w.r.t. n yields
The first term on the RHS of (3) represents the adverse effect of solvency shock on the component: the larger is the component, the more severe will be this adverse effect. The second term represents the positive effect of smoothing the idiosyncratic shock: this effect declines with the increase in n because of the concavity of the utility function. A trivial case is when : the negative effect dominates, no connection is formed.
For some reasonable utility functions (or , it could be that the positive effect dominates if n is small while the negative effect dominates if n is large. In this case, the optimal network would be the one which maximises (2), as illustrated in Figure 2 , so there is a limit to the optimal size of a group.
Note that in a naturally formed network, an isolated node can make connections and a connected node can break its connections, so the network will have isolated components of size n*. In this case, the probability of systemic risk is .
III. Circuit Breaker (withdrawal of node)
In , the policy of isolating the node hit by a large shock was not examined, maybe because of difficulties associated with substantial cross-holdings of assets among banks. Side-stepping such issues, let us assume that the large shock is clearly identifiable. Assume that if a connected node is hit by the large shock, its connections to other nodes in a component are severed; then the expected utility of a member in an n-group with such kind of "circuit breaker" is:
The above is an increasing function of n, so the optimal size of a group is N. The idea that by separating systemically important nodes could allow the network to benefit fully its risk sharing function is intuitive with the aid of simple structure considered. The real financial networks are rarely completely connected: they usually exhibit small world properties with fat-tail degree distribution and high clustering coefficient. These imply that there are some important financial hubs which are highly inter-connected -the so-called "super-spreaders". Haldane (2009) and Haldane and May (2011) have argued that it is crucial to identify such "super-spreaders" and to impose appropriate regulatory measures (such as higher capital buffers) to reduce their adverse effect on the stability of the whole financial system. In the similar vein, Stiglitz (2011) suggested, in the context of global financial integration, the use of "circuit breaker" (through, e.g., the use of capital control) to separate the infected component from the rest of the system.
As disc used in Conclusion, the Independent Commission on Banking, in Final Report (2011), advocates a structural approach to banking regulation: by 'ring-fencing' commercial banks from their investment arms, and subjecting them to limits on risk assets and different capital adequacy requirements. Could the 'circuit breaker' used in the simple model above be a metaphor for such ex ante structural separation? 1 n N Figure 3 . Expected utility of a node with circuit breaker
